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Abstract
This paper proposes a reduced form model of dynamic duopoly
in the context of heterogeneous innovations framework. Two agents
invest into product and process innovations simultaneously. Every
newly introduced product has its own dimension of process-improving
innovations and there is a continuum of possible new products. In the
area of process innovations the costless imitation effect is modelled
while in the area of product innovations agents are cooperating with
each other. As a result the specialization of innovative activity is ob-
served. This specialization arises from strategic interactions of agents
in both fields of innovative activity and is endogenously defined from
the dynamics of the model.
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1 Introduction
The main focus of the paper is on the modelling of strategic interactions of
agents in the field of innovations. To this end the production activities of the
agents is not explicitly modelled. Only the investment activities related to
the introduction of new products and their further refinement are accounted
for. The time-horizon of the model is set to be infinite for tractability rea-
sons.
Despite of the simplicity of the framework suggested in the model, it al-
lows to catch several major issues relevant for dynamic interactions in the
field of innovations. First, it is shown that the costless imitation does not
lead to incentive to decrease investments into process innovations for both
agents simultaneously if one would account for their cooperation on the more
fundamental level of product innovations. One of the agents appears to be
the leader, which does not benefit from the imitation effect, while the other
one positions herself as a follower, reducing her own investments to benefit
from the technological spillover created from the activities of the first agent.
Next, in the area of product innovations the united efforts of both agents are
distributed unevenly. Instead, there is a natural specialization of investment
activities of both agents. The agent, who is benefiting from the technology
spillovers in process innovations (named ‘the follower’ in the sequel) puts
more investments into the product introduction activities. However, in the
simplest case of open-loop strategies the other agent invests non-zero amount
into the product innovations also. In an effect the agent who is the most effi-
cient in one or another type of innovative activities carries the major burden
of investments in this direction while benefiting from the investments of the
other agent in the other type of innovations.
One may consider the suggested model of strategic interactions as an
extension and combination of the results from different directions. First, it
contributes to the line of literature on strategic interactions between innovat-
ing agents in the spirit of (Reinganum 1982), (Judd 2003) and late (Lamber-
tini and Mantovani 2010). These approaches are extended by considering the
distributed parameter model and formulating the fully dynamical differential
game with richer strategic sets for both players. Next, approaches to imita-
tion , (Gallini 1992) and R&D joint ventures, (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin
1988) are combined in a single model and it is demonstrated that these two
effects are complementary in nature and resulting strategies cannot be op-
timal in a dynamic context while taking into account only one of them. At
last, everything is put together to obtain the model of strategic interactions
of innovative agents in heterogeneous multi-product framework which might
be considered more general in its nature then previous findings in the field.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section a brief
summary on relevant studies is presented. Next basic assumptions and the
framework of the model are considered in brief. In the following section
the model is extended to the two agents case. It is solved sequentially
through employing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Maximum Principle
approaches. After obtaining analytical results the dynamics of the optimal
investment strategies for both agents is considered and the nature and form
of the resulting strategic interactions as well as some practical implications
of the findings are discussed.
2 Related Research
To our knowledge one of the first attempts to model the strategic interactions
of oligopolistic agents via the differential games approach is given in the work
of Reinganum, (Reinganum 1982). In this paper the author combined static
games approach with optimal control one to obtain the dynamic game of
R&D competition in a n-firm industry. However this was not the first paper
on the influence of the market structure on the outcome of R&D competi-
tion. One of the first works in the field is that of Loury, (Loury 1979). In this
pioneering work the discrete single innovation is assumed and n firms com-
pete for being the first to introduce the new product. The first firm which
would introduce such a product obtains an exclusive right for its produc-
tion and hence receives the perpetual stream of profits associated with this
product. This model lacks the explicit formulation of strategic interactions
and consists of identical optimization problems for all the firms. However
the equilibrium outcome does depend on the number of firms in the indus-
try. Another basic approach to modelling R&D competition consists mainly
in static game formulation, as in the work of Dasgupta&Stigliz, (Dasgupta
and Stiglitz 1980) where no explicit dynamical interactions appear. In their
model they mainly tackle with the question how the market structure (e.g.
monopoly versus oligopoly) would influence the equilibrium level and price
of innovative products. They come to the conclusion that it is the elasticity
of the market demand function which defines the optimal structure of the
industry.
In the work of Reinganum these two basic approaches are combined in a
single model and this is the basic paper one would compare the suggested
framework with, since the same differential games approach is used here. On
the other hand he pertains the general structure of Loury, namely there is
a single innovative process and every player seeks to introduce this given
product first to the market.
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Concerning the particular form of interactions between players, the im-
itation effect at no cost in the dynamics of process innovations is assumed.
There exists some literature on such kind of imitation. One of the examples
is the work of Gallini, (Gallini 1992), although his approach is different from
the one assumed here. Namely, he analyses the effect of imitation of the
patented product which is costly, while in the suggested model it is assumed
to be costless. In this respect the imitation effect is treated as the undi-
rected technological spillover from the leading firm to the other one, while
any firm may become a leader or the follower in the process innovations. It
turns out that in the given framework the imitation effect may constitute
the equilibrium only if one take into account the underlying process of va-
riety expansion also. Another more recent work on dynamic interactions of
R&D firms is that of Judd, (Judd 2003). In this paper the author analyses
the multi-stage innovative race between multiple agents with multi-product
situation and this is rather close to the suggested approach. Nevertheless he
assumes the multi-stage structure of the game and hence a static situation
with some transition between stages whereas here the dynamic game with
continuous time is modelled. He finds out, that there is an ambiguity in
the results of a game, namely a given player may increase his expenditure
(investments in our case) when the other agent is ahead of him, while this
is not profitable for him as an imitator. It is demonstrated that in the sug-
gested model this is not the case and any ambiguity disappears if one would
consider both aspects of innovation.
The most recent paper on product and process innovations in differential
games framework is the work (Lambertini and Mantovani 2010). This pa-
per assumes fully dynamical model of the duopoly competition of innovating
firms. The suggested model differs from the work of Lambertini&Mantovani
in two significant aspects. First, in their model authors assume uncertainty
of innovations in the form of Poisson arrival rates, while the suggested model
does not contain uncertainty in any form. However the same form of uncer-
tainty may be easily introduced into the suggested model and will not change
major results of the paper. Next, the discussed paper does not handle hetero-
geneity of innovations and hence is reduced to the differential game with two
states, while the suggested model allows for distributed nature of innovations
and all products differ from each other in their investment characteristics.
This is more in line with the setup of Lin, (Lin 2004), but with fully dynamic
context. The result on endogenous specialization of players is mainly due to
dynamic context and heterogeneity of innovations being modeled simultane-
ously.
The last feature of the suggested model is the R&D cooperation on the
level of products variety expansion (product innovations). It is argued that
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such a situation is more typical for R&D firms then the full-scale competition
on both levels. First such a type of strategic interactions has been considered
in D’Aspremaunt&Jacquemin, (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988) where it
is argued that in real economies the majority of R&D activities is performed
in the form of joint R&D ventures if one would consider innovations of big
enough size. As long as one assumes that the variety expansion represents
the process of introduction of completely new products to the market it is
rather natural to assume the precense of joint cooperative efforts on this
level. This would mean that agents share common knowledge and efforts
concerning this part of their innovative activity.
3 Assumptions and Basic Framework
In this section the formal model is introduced together with the underlying
economic intuition.
3.1 Assumptions
Assume there are two firms in a given industry. The industry is mature and
no growth of the demand is expected for existing products variety. There are
equilibrium quantities for both firms which depend on the production costs.
However, these costs are fixed for mature products and are not subject to
change in the result of new process innovations. Both firms act as monopolists
in their markets which are separated and cannot be entered by the other firm.
In this respect the firms are regional monopolies. This implies that profit of
every firm depends only on its own production costs but not of that of the
other one.
Assumption 1 Both firms are perfectly separated with respect to their pro-
duction.
This assumption may be relaxed to allow for interactions of the firms on
the product market also. However, this will not influence the main result
of the paper since the production decision does not influence the innovative
decisions, while the latter influence the production. We abstract from the
explicit derivation of production policies here and note that this would be
similar to the separation of production and knowledge accumulation for the
firm as in,for example, (Dawid, Greiner, and Zou 2010).
These monopolists are maximizing their profits by developing new products,
which are then introduced to the market.
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Assumption 2 The only source of new profit for both firms is the devel-
opment of new products which leads to the increase in the existing range of
products, common for both firms, over time, n(t) > 0.
Of course, the profit is derived from existing and mature products also, but
innovative activities do not influence this as well as the production decisions
for these products.
Assume the process of development of products is continuous in time and
yield new products (which are new versions of some basic for the industry
product) with some rate. Let us call this rate the rate of variety expansion.
Assumption 3 The product innovations are continuous in time and new
products appear at a continuous basis, ˙n(t) ≥ 0.
Assume that the range of these new products is limited from above. The
product innovations are limited to upgrades of some basic product which
defines the industry (e.g. cell phones industry produces different versions of
cell phones but not computers). We do not model fundamental inventions,
which introduce totally new products to the economy by this model and
hence it is natural to require that there is limited capacity of the industry
for the variety of products which are somewhat similar to each other.
Assumption 4 Product innovations are limited by the maximal possible range
of products, n(t) ≤ N .
Assume these newly introduced products initially require very much resources
for their production and hence each of the firms allocates part of its R&D
capacity on process innovations related to these new products. Every new
product is than intensively studied with respect to opportunities for its costs
minimization. As there are numerous new products (continuum of) there
are numerous streams of such cost-minimizing processes each of them being
associated with every new product.
Assumption 5 Every product has its own dimension of process innova-
tions or ‘quality’ which depends on time and is different for both firms,
∀i ∈ n(t)∃q[j],[l]i (t).
Since the introduction of new product is simultaneous for both firms, they
start their investments into these new products simultaneously. It is natural
to require that at the time of introduction, denoted by ti(0) for each product
i the level of process technology is zero.
Assumption 6 At the moment of introduction of the product i its ‘quality’
is zero for both firms, q
[j],[l]
i (ti(0))|i=n(t)
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Assume at each point in time, each of the firms has to choose optimally
the level of investments being made into the development of new products
(product innovations) and into the development of production technology of
already existing products (process innovations). These investment streams
cannot be negative.
Assumption 7 Product innovations and process innovations require differ-
ent types of investments, which vary over time, while process innovations for
every product are also different u[j],[l](t) ≥ 0; g[j],[l]i (t) ≥ 0
Assume also that firms are long-run players and do not restrict their planning
to some certain length of time. Hence, the innovations of both types occur
continuously up to infinite time.
Assumption 8 There is no terminal time for both processes of innovations,
0 ≥ t <∞
The last point to mention is that we assume that all innovations are certain.
This is rather strong limitation, but allows to concentrate on the key issues of
this paper: endogenous specialization of innovative activities in the presence
of heterogeneity of new products.
Assumption 9 All innovations do not have any uncertainty associated with
them.
Under the given assumptions it must be clear that the only channels of
interactions between the two firms should lie in the field of their innovative
activity. That is, these firms share the knowledge on new products being cre-
ated as a result of their investments u[j],[l](t) while benefiting from spillovers
of process technologies from the other firm, q
[j],[l]
i (t). This last has yet to be
specified. Up to the this point the assumptions and the suggested framework
follows the model of a single monopolist as described in (Bondarev 2010b)
with extension to two agents. Next we discuss the profit generation and
objective functions of both firms in details.
3.2 Objective Function
In this section we introduce the objective functions of both players.
Consider first the situation in the absence of innovations for each of the
firms. The natural objective of the firm is the maximization of its profits,
pij,l(t) → max for any given time period. This paper concentrates on just
one part of activities of such a firm, namely on the process of its innovative
activities. To put this in line with profit maximization behaviour we assumed
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that markets for all existing products are mature, yield some constant profit
with stable prices and output. Production policy of every firm is assumed
to follow standard rules of monopolistic behaviour under profit maximiza-
tion (since the perfect separation of markets): given (constant) demand, the
monopolist is setting the price and production as to maximize its profit. In
mature markets the process innovations reached their maximum and thus no
further improvements to the production process may be made. Hence, the
production costs are also constant in time. These considerations lead to the
conclusion that in mature markets the monopolist’s production and pricing
(and hence profits) are constant.
Proposition 1 For those products which are already in mature stage, the
production, price and profit for each of the firms are constant.
Because of this one may abstract from this part of firms’ activities in the
optimization problem.
The objective function of such a reduced optimization problem for both firms
is then given by:
J [j],[l]
def
=
def
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[∫ n(t)
0
(
q[j],[l](i, t)− 1
2
g[j],[l](i, t)2
)
di− 1
2
u[j],[l](t)2
]
dt→ max
u[j],[l],g[j],[l]
.
(1)
The basic intuition behind (1) is clear: every firm is maximizing the effect
from its process innovations for every of the introduced products at every
time t. The range of products, being introduced till time t is given by n(t)
and hence the difference in the effect of process innovations and the invest-
ments into them is evaluated over this range at any point in time. At the
same time the investments into the creation of new products, u[j],[l], nega-
tively influence the total generated by innovations value for the firm while
the introduction of new products at some continuous rate enlarges the space
of products, which production may be refined through process innovations.
Observe that the introduction of the new product per se does not bring the
increase in the value for the firm, since it is assumed that such a product has
zero level of technology. The objective is to maximize the effect of innova-
tions of both types at the firm performance at the infinite time horizon.
So far both firms are independent from each other in all their charac-
teristics. Now we introduce the link between the firms in the field of their
innovative activity. This comes from the dynamics of their state variables,
n(t), q
[j],[l]
i (t) and is described below.
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3.3 Dynamics of Innovations
As seen from the objective, both firms are symmetric with respect to the
value generated by the innovations of both types for them. Suppose the
given firms join their efforts in the development of variety expansion over the
same potential products’ space, while having possibly different investment
efficiencies. Then variety expansion dynamics is governed by the law:
˙n(t) = α[j]u
[j](t) + α[l]u
[l](t).(2)
where:
• n(t) denoted the variety expansion level being reached at the time t;
• u[j],[l](t) are investments of firms [j], [l] into the process of variety ex-
pansion at time t;
• α[j],[l] are investment efficiencies for both firms which are assumed to
be constant in time.
This means both firms have the same underlying variety expansion process
while freely choosing the level of efforts they would devote to the develop-
ment of this variety. Note that this does not exclude the possibility for one or
the other firm to have zero investments while benefiting from the investments
being made by the other through using achieved variety level.
Let these firms have different and separate process innovations processes
for each product within the products range. Firms do not benefit from in-
vestments of each other into these process innovations, but they may copy
the progress of the other in the case their own innovations level for the same
product is lower. In the effect one has two dynamic processes linked with
each other and two different independent streams of investments:
˙
q
[j]
i (t) = γ[j]
√
N − ig[j]i (t)− β[j]q[j]i (t) + θ ×max{0, (q[l]i (t)− q[j]i (t))};
˙
q
[l]
i (t) = γ[l]
√
N − ig[l]i (t)− β[j]q[l]i (t) + θ ×max{0, (q[j]i (t)− q[l]i (t))}.(3)
where:
• q[j],[l]i (t) are technology levels achieved by process innovations into the
product i by the agent [j], [l] at the time t;
• g[j],[l]i (t) are investments of both agents into the development of the
production process for product i at time t;
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• γ[j],[l] are efficiencies of investments into the process innovations for
agents [j], [l], constant across products and time;
• β[j],[l] are technology decay rates in the absence of investments for both
agents;
• θ is the speed of costless imitation, equal for both agents.
Observe that the term
√
N − i in both processes defines the decreasing effi-
ciency of investments into the quality growth for both players across products’
range. It is assumed that the higher is the index i of the product, the harder
it is to improve its production technology due to the increased complexity
of the product. The specific form of this decreasing function is chosen to
linearise the resulting dynamical systems. This is done following the same
arguments as in (Bondarev 2010a).
As a result the firm’s level of process innovations may grow in two dif-
ferent ways. As long as the given firm is the leader in process innovations
for a given product, e.g. t : q
[j]
i (t) > q
[l]
i (t), its ‘quality’ grows only due to
its own investments in process innovations for this product, g
[j]
i (t). At the
same time, the other firm’s production technology is inferior to the one being
developed by the first firm and it benefits not only from its own investments
but also from the ‘imitation effect’: it benefits from the difference between
the leader’s technology level and its own one. Clearly this effect will boost
the second firm’s process innovations but will wear down eventually while
the follower’s technology approaches that of the leader.
The dynamics of product and process innovations is subject to a number of
static constraints which are formalizations of assumptions given above:
u[j],[l](t) ≥ 0;
g[j],[l](i, t) ≥ 0;
0 ≤ n(t) ≤ N ;
q[j],[l](i, t) |i=n(t)= 0;
q[j],[l](i, 0) = 0,∀i ∈ I;
n(0) = n0 ≥ 0.(4)
These are essentially non-negativity and boundedness requirements for state
variables for both firms as well as irreversibility of investments into both
types of innovations. I stands for the notion of the products space.
Observe that it follows from (2),(3), that the only form of strategic inter-
action in process innovations is the costless imitation effect which influences
the dynamic of state variables but does not influence directly the objective
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function. At the same time even such simple introduction of interdepen-
dencies between firms’ strategies allows for the endogenous specialization of
investments between them.
4 Solution
In this section the solution techniques applied to the problem formulated
above are discussed.
4.1 Decomposition of the Problem
Given the basic formulation of dynamical problems of both agents above, it is
clear that the optimal solution has to be found in the form of the equilibrium
pair of strategies in the differential game framework. From the general point
of view the model considered here is the infinite-dimensional one as long as
one have the continuum of process innovations associated with each product
for every player. This may provide some difficulties in formal construction of
the game. However due to the special structure of the dynamic framework
being used it is possible to decompose the problem into ‘quality’ growth
problem and variety expansion problem. This can be done due to the fact
that process innovations do not depend on the variety expansion except for
the time of emergence of new products. Then every such a problem should
be the finite-dimensional one and as long as it is of the linear-quadratic
form, one may be assured that equilibrium exists for each such a game of
process innovations under the same conditions as in standard linear-quadratic
differential game, (Dockner, Jorgensen, Long, and Sorger 2000). Then the
results obtained for this game may be used for solution of variety expansion
problem which is also the differential game but with only one state, n(t). For
this one may rewrite the objective functional of both players (1) in terms of
values generated by the process innovations and by the product innovations
games.
To decompose the value function of the overall model, first we make use
of the observation above. Starting from the time of emergence (denoted by
t(0)i) value of each product’s process innovations is independent of variety
expansion process:
V
[j],[l]
i (q) = max
g[j],[l]
∫ ∞
t(0)i
e−r(t−t(0)i)(q[j],[l]i (t)−
1
2
g
[j],[l]
i (t)
2)dt.(5)
where t(0)i is the time of emergence of the product i, which is defined from
the dynamics of the variety expansion process and is similar for both agents
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due to the form of dynamic constraints (2),(3). With infinite time horizon
the problem of process innovations management is the time-autonomous one
and hence the time of the products emergence does not influence the value
generation process and can be normalized for all products to zero, (Bondarev
2010b).
Proposition 2 Value functions of process innovations management game
for both firms, V
[j],[l]
i (q) are invariant to the ratio of investments of both
firms into new products development, u[j],[l](t) and hence to the emergence
time of this product, t(0)i.
Second part of the overall value generation consists of the intensity of in-
troduction of new products at every time given the expected value of the
stream of profit derived from the reduced costs of production (which comes
from process innovations) of the newly introduced products. This part may
be represented by the integral over all potential stream of process innova-
tions for each product over it’s life-cycle. At the same time this information
is already contained in the value function of the ‘quality’ problem above,
so it suffices to integrate over all potential products at initial time. Last
observation to be made is that at the moment of the emergence of the new
product it’s production technology is zero, as it is required by (4). These
yield the value function for variety expansion problem in the following form:
V [j],[l](n) =
= max
u[j],[l]
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
(α[j]u[j](t) + α[l]u[l](t))× V [j],[l]i (0) |i=n(t) −
1
2
u[j],[l](t)2
)
dt.
(6)
In the last equation value generated by the process innovations management
game for each firm is estimated at the zero technology level for the product
next to be invented. Hence one may sequentially solve the process innova-
tions game for an arbitrary i, then calculate the associated value function at
the zero technology level and i = n(t) and use this last as an input for the
variety expansion game.
Observe that a decomposition method is valid here since there is no com-
petition on the level of variety expansion. Joint variety expansion process
yields the coincidence of emergence times of all new products for both firms.
There is no dependence of value creation at the production technology level
from the relative speed of variety expansion. Moreover, every firm is able to
estimate the potential accumulated value from the production (process in-
novations) of each product in the potential products’ space, because it may
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estimate it at zero technology levels not only for itself but for the other firm
also, since the time of emergence is the same. Then the value function for
the variety expansion does not depend on technology levels or process in-
novations themselves, but only from the potential value generated by the
refinement of the production technology for each product as a whole. In the
effect this value function although different for both firms (as their process
innovations’ value functions are different) is invariant to the future process
innovations associated with every new product i.
Proposition 3 Value function of the product innovations game for both
players, V [j],[l](n) is invariant to the investments being made into the process
innovations of all the products except the boundary one, g
[j],[l]
i=n(t). Moreover, it
depends only on the total value generated by this product at the time of its
emergence, V
[j],[l]
i (0) |i=n(t).
In an effect one may observe that there is an influence of process innovations
on the intensity of product innovations but the inverse effect is almost absent.
This form of the interdependence of product and process innovations is in line
with the empirical literature on the subject, (Faria and Lima 2009) (Kraft
1990).
4.2 Process Innovations
Consider first the problem of process innovations management for each prod-
uct i for both firms [j], [l].
V [j](q
[j]
i (t)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rs
(
q
[j]
i (s)−
1
2
g
[j]
i (s)
)
ds→ max
g[j]
;
V [l](q
[l]
i (t)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rs
(
q
[l]
i (s)−
1
2
g
[l]
i (s)
)
ds→ max
g[l]
.(7)
with the respect to dynamic constraints (3) for every product i.
These two problems constitute the differential game with two states,
{q[j]i (t), q[l]i (t)} and two controls which are strategies of the firms, {g[j]i (t), g[l]i (t)}
for every i. Note that this formulation is of the same form across all prod-
ucts’ production technologies and they are independent of each other. Hence
solution of this game is valid for any i. The associated pair of HJB equations
is dependent on both states for each firm as well as on investments of both
firms.
Depending on the realization of the max{0, (q[j,l]i (t)− q[l,j]i (t))} functions
in (3) one has 3 different formulations of HJB equations which correspond
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to the leadership of one or the other firm and symmetric dynamics with no
leadership.
Due to the specifics of dynamic constraints on process innovations, (3),
value functions of both firms are not differentiable along the line q
[j]
i (t) =
q
[l]
i (t). This creates difficulties in the formulation of optimal strategies for
the symmetric case. Hence in this paper we consider only the situation with
constant leadership q
[j]
i (t) > q
[l]
i (t) for simplicity. In this case technology
evolution path of the leading firm is always higher than that of the following
one. It is also the case with only one steady state for the dynamical system
(3). The exact conditions on parameters for such an outcome of the pro-
cess innovations game are derived in (Bondarev 2011). The symmetric case
strategies are to be considered as the immediate extension of the results of
the current paper. In the current paper one may assume higher investment
efficiency of the leading firm and equal decay rates. This is not the only
alternative when the constant leadership and single steady state of the game
takes place, but it is the simplest one. So, from now on assume
γ[j] > γ[l];
β[j] = β[l].(8)
Such conditions guarantees the existence of only one steady state with firm
j being the leader in process innovations.
As long as one of the firms has the leadership in the process innovations,
that is, q
[j]
i (t) > q
[l]
i (t), its dynamics does not depend on the imitation effect,
while the other’s does. Then subsequent pair of HJB equations may be
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written as:
rV
[j]
i =
max
g[j](•)
{
q
[j]
i (t)−
1
2
g
[j]
i (t)
2 +
∂V
[j]
i
∂q
[j]
i (t)
(
γ[j]
√
(N − i)g[j]i (t)− β[j]q[j]i (t)
)
+
∂V
[j]
i
∂q
[l]
i (t)
(
γ[l]
√
(N − i)g[l]i (t)− β[l]q[l]i (t)− θ ×
(
q
[j]
i (t)− q[l]i (t)
))}
;
rV
[l]
i =
max
g[l](•)
{
q
[l]
i (t)−
1
2
g
[l]
i (t)
2 +
∂V
[l]
i
∂q
[j]
i (t)
(
γ[j]
√
(N − i)g[j]i (t)− β[j]q[j]i (t)
)
+
∂V
[l]
i
∂q
[l]
i (t)
(
γ[l]
√
(N − i)g[l]i (t)− β[l]q[l]i (t) + θ ×
(
q
[j]
i (t)− q[l]i (t)
))}
.
(9)
Observe that in this formulation only the second firm l, which is called the
‘follower’ is benefiting from the technological spillover resulting from superior
production technology of the other firm j. This can be seen from the form of
the dynamic constraint on the dynamics of technologies which is now different
between firms and includes the spillover effect only for the follower.
The first-order conditions for optimal investments depend only on the
own firm’s value function but not on that of the other’s:
g
[j]
i (t)
∗ = γ[j]
√
(N − i)× ∂V
[j]
i
∂q
[j]
i (t)
;
g
[l]
i (t)
∗ = γ[l]
√
(N − i)× ∂V
[l]
i
∂q
[l]
i (t)
.(10)
Hence the form of the optimal control is defined by the form of the underly-
ing value function for both firms separately.
In this paper we limit ourselves to open-loop type equilibria which corre-
sponds to the linear value functions of both firms. It may be shown that no
other value functions of the polynomial form may fit the problem. Hence the
set of strategies derived further on is the only one optimal in the class of at
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most linear feedback controllers with constant leadership of one of the firms.
Formally, assume the following form of value functions for both firms:
V
[j],[l]
i = A
[j],[l] × q[j]i +B[j],[l] × q[l]i + C [j],[l].(11)
The following result follows from first order conditions immediately:
Proposition 4 The optimal investments rule for each of the firms does not
depend on the level of technology of the other firm nor on its value generation
process.
Consider first the HJB equation for the leading firm. This firm does not
benefit from the imitation effect but its problem is influenced by the imitation
effect present for the firm l. The position of the leader is characterized by
the condition:
∀t : q[j]i (t) > q[l]i (t).
Of course, as long as one of the firms is the leader in process innovations, the
other is the follower.
Inserting (11) into the pair of HJB equations (9) one obtains the following
set of coefficients for the leaders’ value function:
A[j] = 1
β[j]+r
;
B[j] = 0;
C [j] = 1
2
γ2
[j]
(β[j]+r)
2r
(N − i).
(12)
Hence coefficients for the leader’s value function do not depend on the opti-
mal investments of the follower. This set of coefficients corresponds to the
linear value function of the leader with the absence of cross-effects and hence
the optimal strategy is constant as long as ∀t : q[j]i (t) > q[l]i (t). Together with
first-order conditions on controls the derived value function of the leader con-
stitutes optimal (constant) control for the leader:
g
[j]
i =
γ[j]
√
(N − i)
r + β[j]
= const.(13)
Proposition 5 The optimal investments rule for the leader is constant for
each product i and does not depend on the imitation speed θ nor on the
achieved technology level q
[j]
i (t). However, process innovations are differ-
ent across products and this difference is proportional to the position of the
porduct in the product space, (N − i).
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Now consider the problem of the follower. Inserting (11) into the second
equation in (9) results in a system of equations for coefficients of the followers’
value function:
A[l] = 1
θ+β[l]+r
;
B[l] = θ
(β[j]+r)(β[l]+θ+r)
;
C [l] = 1
2
(r2γ2
[l]
+β2
[j]
γ2
[l]
+2γ2
[j]
θ2+2θβ[l]γ
2
[j]
+(2θγ2
[j]
+2β[j]γ
2
[l]
)r)
r(β[j]+r)
2(r+β[l]+θ)
2 (N − i).
(14)
Here value function of the follower depends on the level of technology achieved
by process innovations of the leader. Since this last is known already, one has
the explicit formulation of the value function for the follower. One may derive
the optimal investments of the follower according to first order conditions.
g
[l]
i =
γ[l]
√
N − i
r + θ + β[l]
= const;
∀t : q[l]i (t) < q[j]i (t).(15)
The constant strategy does not depend on the follower’s or the leader’s
technology levels except for the fact that this strategy is effective only for
follower’s technology being inferior to that of the leader. This investment
rule defines constant rate of investments but lesser then that for the leader
(also constant). It differs from the latter by the term θ in the denominator.
Provided θ is the imitation speed and is defined from zero to one, this de-
creases the overall investment rate for the follower. These observations are
summarized below.
Proposition 6 The optimal investments rule for the follower is also con-
stant for each product i and does not depend on the achieved technology level
q
[l]
i (t). However it depends on the imitation speed θ and is decreasing in it.
It also differs for every product and decreases with the position of the product
in the products space I. Moreover, 0 ≤ g[l]i ≤ g[j]i ∀i ∈ I with strict inequalities
on both sides for all i < N
Provided formulation of optimal controls, the dynamic system for process
innovations in the constant leader-follower regime being considered here is:
˙
q
[j]
i (t) =
γ2
[j]
β[j]+r
(N − i)− β[j]q[j]i (t);
˙
q
[l]
i (t) =
γ2
[l]
β[l]+θ+r
(N − i) + θq[j]i (t)− (β[l] + θ)q[l]i (t).
(16)
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From this system one may observe that the improvements of production
technology of the follower is faster for higher technology level of the leader
while it’s investments’ rate is lesser then for the leader, provided (8). At the
same time the already reached level of own technology decreases the process
innovations rate for the follower to a higher extent, since θ is positive. Hence
one may conclude:
Proposition 7 The level of production technology being reached by the pro-
cess innovations of the follower is always smaller then that of the leader for
any product i for all times, ∀t > 0, i < N : q[j]i (t) > q[l]i (t).
This dynamical system has the following solution:
q
[j]
i (t) =
γ2[j](N − i)
β[j](r + β[j])
× (1− e−β[j]t);
q
[l]
i (t) =
(
1 + (N − i)× (E1(e
(β[l]+θ)t + 1)
β[l] + θ
− E2(e
(β[l]−β[j]+θ)t + 1)
β[l] − β[j] + θ
)
× e−(β[l]+θ)t.(17)
where E1, E2 = f(γ[j],[l], β[j],[l], θ) are some functions of parameters only.
The subsequent values generated by the process innovations with constant
leadership:
V
[j]
i =
q
[j]
i
r + β[j]
+
1
2
γ2[j]
r(r + β[j])2
(N − i);
V
[l]
i = 2
(
q
[l]
i
θ + r + β[l]
+
θ
r + β[j]
× q
[j]
i
θ + r + β[l]
)
+
+
(
θγ2[j]
r(r + β[j])(r + θ + β[l])
1
r + β[j]
+
1
2
γ2[l]
r(r + θ + β[l])
)
(N − i).(18)
From this it might be seen that it is not profitable for the firm which is
the leader in process innovations to choose the investments rate lower than
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optimal. If one would do so, it would like to benefit from the spillover effect
as the follower does. To this end the leader should choose the investments
rule in the same way as the following firm. Then its value function will be
of the same type as of the follower. To demonstrate, that this cannot be
optimal for the leading firm, it is sufficient to compare its value functions for
the case of being the leader and for the case of imitating the other firm. Since
we consider open-loop strategies case here, the investment path is chosen at
the time of emergence of product i when technologies for both players are at
zero level. Hence the value functions for the firm j at this point are given
by:
V
[L]
i =
1
2
γ2[j]
r(r + β[j])2
(N − i);
V
[F ]
i =
(
θγ2[l]
r(r + β[l])(r + θ + β[j])
1
r + β[l]
+
1
2
γ2[j]
r(r + θ + β[j])
)
(N − i).(19)
for being the leader and being the follower respectively. Direct comparison of
these values while (8) holds shows that the first value is always higher than
the second one.
Proposition 8 The value of process innovations game is always higher for
the firm which leads in investment efficiencies when it invests as a leader in
this game, V
[L]
i > V
[F ]
i while the opposite holds for the firm which has lower
efficiency γ.
For illustration of the difference in investment policies caused by leader-
follower patterns we take the following set of parameters which correspond
to leadership of firm j in process innovations. Efficiency of investments into
variety expansion is assumed to be equal for both firms:
SETJL := [γ[j] = 0.7, γ[l] = 0.4, β[j] = 0.2, β[l] = 0.2];
(20)
with
[n0 = 1, α[j] = α[l] = 0.5, r = 0.01, θ = 0.15, N = 1000]
for both variants.
First consider the form of process innovations paths for both firms on Figure
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Figure 1: Difference in technologies for different products and be-
tween firms
1.
It might be seen that leader’s ‘quality’ is always higher then that of the
following firm while both firms’ technology levels are lower for every next in-
vented product then for the preceding one. This last comes from the assump-
tion of decreasing returns on investments into every next product technology,
which is reflected in the
√
N − i term entering the evolution equations. It
can also be seen that process innovations for each product eventually reach
the steady-state level and do not increase further on. This steady state lev-
els are different for the leader and the follower and also differ across products.
Proposition 9 For each product i and each firm there is a unique steady-
state level of production technology,
¯
q
[j,l]
i . For each product i this level is
higher for the leading firm,
¯
q
[j]
i >
¯
q
[l]
i . It is lower for every next product i+ 
for both firms than for all the preceding ones,
¯
q
[j,l]
i+ >
¯
q
[j,l]
i .
Inserting solutions (17) into value functions for both firms one obtains values
generated by the process innovations management game as functions of ex-
ogenous parameters only. We need values generated by this game at the zero
level of technology and at initial time to proceed to the variety expansion
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part. These are:
V
[j]
i (0, 0) |(i=n(t))=
γ[j]
(r + β[j])2r
(N − n(t));
(21)
V
[l]
i (0, 0) |(i=n(t))=
=
1
2
r2γ2[l] + r(2γ
2
[l]β[j] + 2γ
2
[j]θ) + γ
2
[l]β
2
[j] + 2θγ
2
[j]β[l] + 2θ
2γ2[j]
r(r + β[j])2(r + θ + β[l])2
(N − n(t)).
These values are used for the solution of the variety expansion problem in
the way discussed previously.
4.3 Variety Expansion Problem
Variety expansion problem is the differential game with one state and two
controls. Both firms invest simultaneously in the variety expansion and ben-
efit from the resulting variety on common base thus sharing all the informa-
tion on this level of innovations. The dynamic problem for both firms is to
maximize the potential output of innovations given the costs of investments.
Note that the potential profit in this part of the model consists only from
the future accumulated profit from development of production technologies
(process innovations) of newly invented products. Since we limit ourselves to
the case of open-loop strategies in the process innovations game the variety
expansion problem is also solved in this class of strategies. The other strate-
gies, of piecewise-constant and of closed-loop type may also be considered as
an immediate extension.
For the characterization of the open-loop solution for the variety expan-
sion game the maximum principle method is convenient. One may rewrite
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the problem of variety expansion as following:
J [j] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
(α[j]u
[j](t) + α[l]u
[l](t))V[j](0, 0) |(i=n(t)) −1
2
u[j](t)2
)
dt→ max
u[j](•)
;
J [l] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
(α[j]u
[j](t) + α[l]u
[l](t))V[l](0, 0) |(i=n(t)) −1
2
u[l](t)2
)
dt→ max
u[l](•)
;
s.t.
˙n(t) = α[j]u
[j](t) + α[l]u
[l](t);
u[j](t), u[l](t) ≥ 0,∀t ≥ 0.
(22)
where V[j](0, 0) |(i=n(t)), V[l](0, 0) |(i=n(t)) are given by (22) and depend on
n(t) linearly. Denote the value functions from the process innovations game
associated with the technology of the boundary product i = n(t) by
V[j](0, 0) |(i=n(t))= C [j]v × (N − n(t));
V[l](0, 0) |(i=n(t))= C [l]v × (N − n(t)).(23)
where N is the maximal range of products variety.
The constant part may vary depending on the leadership in the process
innovations game, but the variety expansion is analysed parametrically and
then the dynamics corresponding to different regimes of the process innova-
tions game are compared. This may be done since these constant parts of
value functions above do not depend on the state variable and controls nor
time. This constitutes the one-state differential game with common state
constraint which may be solved using standard techniques. First we con-
struct Hamiltonians of the given problem and derive first-order conditions
on controls. Substituting these into Hamiltonian functions and writing down
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co-state equations yield the canonical system for the variety expansion game:
˙λ[j] = rλ[j] − ∂H
[j]
∂n(t)
=
= (r + α2[j]C
[j]
v )λ[j](t) + α
2
[l]C
[j]
v λ[l](t) + (α
2
[j](C
[j]
v )
2 + α2[l]C
[j]
v C
[l]
v )(N − n(t));
λ˙[l] = rλ[l] − ∂H
[l]
∂n(t)
=
= (r + α2[l]C
[l]
v )λ[l](t) + α
2
[j]C
[l]
v λ[j](t) + (α
2
[l](C
[l]
v )
2 + α2[j]C
[j]
v C
[l]
v )(N − n(t));
˙n(t) = α2[j]λ[j](t) + α
2
[l]λ[l](t) + (α
2
[j](C
[j]
v )
2 + α2[l](C
[l]
v )
2)(N − n(t));
n(0) = n0;
limt→∞e−rtλ[j](t) = 0;
limt→∞e−rtλ[l](t) = 0.
(24)
The first-order conditions on the investments into the variety expansion for
both firms define investments as functions of co-state variables:
∂H[j]
∂u[j]
= 0 : u[j](t)∗ = α[j]λ[j](t) + C [j]v (N − n(t));
∂H[l]
∂u[l]
= 0 : u[l](t)∗ = α[l]λ[l](t) + C [l]v (N − n(t)).(25)
Inserting this into the dynamic constraint for variety expansion together with
(24) constitutes the system of linear ODEs with one initial condition and two
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boundary conditions (transversal ones) which is then solved. The solution is:
n(t)∗ = N − (N − n0)e
1
2
(r−
√
r(r+4α2
[j]
C
[j]
v +4α
2
[l]
C
[l]
v ))t;
λ[j](t)
∗ = − C
[j]
v (α2[j]C
[j]
v + α2[l]C
[j]
v )
2α2[j]C
[j]
v + r +
√
r(r + 4α2[j]C
[j]
v + 4α2[l]C
[l]
v )
×
× 2(N − n0)e
1
2
(r−
√
r(r+4α2
[j]
C
[j]
v +4α
2
[l]
C
[l]
v ))t;
λ[l](t)
∗ = − C
[l]
v (α2[j]C
[j]
v + α2[l]C
[j]
v )
2α2[j]C
[j]
v + r +
√
r(r + 4α2[j]C
[j]
v + 4α2[l]C
[l]
v )
×
× 2(N − n0)e
1
2
(r−
√
r(r+4α2
[j]
C
[j]
v +4α
2
[l]
C
[l]
v ))t.(26)
The product innovations increase the available for both firms variety of prod-
ucts n(t). Speed of this increase is slowing down to zero while the process
approaches the maximal available variety, N .
Proposition 10 With common product innovations process the available for
both firms products variety n(t) is increasing over time and does not reach
the maximal available level in finite time.
Due to the nature of the problem analysed here the co-states’ dynamics is
negative. This happens because of the form the variety expansion problem is
reformulated in this section. Every firm cares only about future investments
into variety expansion. From this point of view shadow price of investments
is negative since every marginal addition to investments reduces future pos-
sibilities to invest. This happens because one has bounded space of products
in the model and inventions reduce the dimensionality of this space. Firms
take into account the profit generated only by the next potential product
but neglect all the products which are already invented before. Hence the
shadow price of investing into the expansion of products variety is negative.
Still, investments are positive for both firms as well as the growth of variety.
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Explicit formulation of investments into variety expansion for both firms is:
u[j](t)∗ =
α[j]C
[j]
v (r +
√
r(r + 4α2[j]C
[j]
v + 4α2[l]C
[l]
v ))
2α2[j]C
[j]
v + 2α2[l]C
[l]
v + r +
√
r(r + 4α2[j]C
[j]
v + 4α2[l]C
[l]
v )
×
×(N − n0)e
1
2
(r−
√
r(r+4α2
[j]
C
[j]
v +4α
2
[l]
C
[l]
v ))t;
u[l](t)∗ =
α[l]C
[l]
v (r +
√
r(r + 4α2[j]C
[j]
v + 4α2[l]C
[l]
v ))
2α2[j]C
[j]
v + 2α2[l]C
[l]
v + r +
√
r(r + 4α2[j]C
[j]
v + 4α2[l]C
[l]
v )
×
×(N − n0)e
1
2
(r−
√
r(r+4α2
[j]
C
[j]
v +4α
2
[l]
C
[l]
v ))t.(27)
These are completely symmetric except for the term α[j,l]C
[j,l]
v which depends
on investment efficiencies and value generated by the process innovations into
the production of the next product to be invented for both firms. Hence rel-
ative scale of investments into the variety expansion depends on the outcome
of the process innovations game.
Proposition 11 Investments of both firms into the product innovations are
positive and depend on the value generated by subsequent process innovations
into the next product
One also may compute the value function of the variety expansion game
as the optimized Hamiltonian function. The value of the variety expansion
game for each of the firms is the respective Hamiltonian function at time
t = 0 and optimal co-state and variety values:
V [j](n) =
1
r
H[j](n(0)∗, λ[j](0)∗) =
= C [j]v ×
(N − n0)2(2α2[l]C [l]v + α2[j]C [j]v )
2α2[l]C
[l]
v + 2α2[j]C
[j]
v + r +
√
r(r + 4α2[j]C
[j]
v + 4α2[l]C
[l]
v )
;
V [l](n) =
1
r
H[l](n(0)∗, λ[l](0)∗) =
= C [l]v ×
(N − n0)2(2α2[j]C [j]v + α2[l]C [l]v )
2α2[l]C
[l]
v + 2α2[j]C
[l]
v + r +
√
r(r + 4α2[j]C
[j]
v + 4α2[l]C
[l]
v )
.(28)
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It can be seen that value function of the variety expansion game is just the
combination of efficiencies of investments into the variety expansion, α[j],[l]
and value functions of the process innovations game of both firms. Observe
that these are independent of the index of the product, i, as they include
estimation of value generation of all products to be invented at the point
i = n0. Hence these two functions give the total value of the combined game
of process and product innovations. However, they may take different values
depending on the leadership regime in process innovations game. Due to the
special and symmetric form of investment efficiencies γ(•) the same regime
is preserved for all product indices i and values of C
[j]
v , C
[l]
v are independent
of i. As long as shadow costs of investments in process innovations game are
independent of i, optimal investments for both firms depend on i in the same
way. Then value functions and process innovations dynamics will depend on
i also in the same way for all regimes and hence conditions for realisation of
one or another regime are independent on i also.
This of course is not necessarily the case with more general (e.g. defined
differently for different i) specification of efficiency functions γ[j],[l](i). No
claims concerning general properties of these functions are made here. One
would stop on the conclusion that with the adopted specification of γ(•)
functions the regime of leadership in process innovations game is constant
across products and hence the value function for the variety expansion part
may be defined independently on i or n(t).
Consider now the shape of the product innovations dynamics. At the
..
Figure 2: Product innovations for cooperative investments and a
single firm
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Figure 2 one may find the comparison of product innovations dynamics of
the differential game with constant leadership in process innovations of one
of the firms with that of the single firm in the market. The model with one
firm is previously considered in (Bondarev 2010b). Here it suffices to note
that the problem of one firm is the same one as that of the leading firm in
process innovations part (with the same investment rule) and variety expan-
sion part is obtained by assuming the single firm investing into the product
innovations instead of two. In this figure the same set SETJL of parameters
is adopted for illustration purposes, while the single monopolist’s efficiency
of process innovations investments is set in between of the two firms at the
level γM =
γ[j]+γ[l]
2
and all other parameters kept similar.
One may see that under the cooperative investments the product inno-
vations speed is higher than for the single monopolistic firm. This happens
due to non-zero investments of both firms into this kind of innovations in
cooperative case. It may be shown that the cooperative investments are pos-
sible in this model due to the specialization of innovative activities of both
firms with natural selection of these activities. This main feature of the sug-
gested model is discussed in the last section of the paper. One thing which
is important to note at this stage is summarized below.
Proposition 12 In the case of the constant leader in process innovations
cooperative product innovations of two firms are higher than those of the
single monopolistic firm, u[j](t) + u[l](t) > u[M ](t). This effect is observed as
long as γ[j] > γ[M ] > γ[l] or vice versa.
5 Specialization of Innovative Activities
Now consider the overall strategic profile and value generated for both firms.
It turns out, that one of the firms invests more into the development of pro-
cess innovations while the other one invests more into the creation of new
products. Thus the specialization of innovative activities is observed. It may
be shown, that this effect is robust to parameters value changes as well as
the leadership regime.
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5.1 Process Innovations Investments
To observe this specialization effect, consider first the set of optimal strategies
for the process innovations game for both firms in the case of constant leader.
g
[j]
L,CON =
γ[j]
√
(N − i)
r + β[j]
;
g
[l]
F,CON =
γ[l]
√
N − i
r + θ + β[l]
.(29)
It is straightforward that the leaders’ investments are higher than those of
the follower for each i, if (8) hold. At the same time leader’s value of the
process innovations game is always lower than that of the follower since its
investments do not depend on the achieved technology level and are higher
than those of the follower. At zero technology level leader’s value is lower
than that of the follower also. This constitutes the specialization of innova-
tive activities of both firms in the area of process innovations.
Figure 3 shows differences in investments of the leading and the following
firm in the area of process innovations for two different products from the
products’ space. The same parameter set, SETJL, is used for this illustra-
tion.
This figure illustrates some additional effect also. Namely, the investments
..
Figure 3: Specialization: the most efficient investor invests more
into process innovations despite of the spillover effect.
of both firms decrease with the increase of the position of the product, i,
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but they are decreasing more rapidly for the leading firm than for the fol-
lowing one. This happens due to the presence of the imitation speed term
in the formulation of the optimal investments of the follower which slows
down the decrease of investments over products. It is more profitable for the
follower to develop the production technology of every next product than for
the leader since this first one benefits from spillover effect and thus has less
incentives to reduce investments. At the same time it has lower efficiency of
investments by assumption (8) and hence its investments for each product
are lower. These observations are summarized below.
Proposition 13 The investments of the leader in process innovations are
higher than those of the follower, g
[j]
L,CON > g
[l]
F,CON for every product i ∈ N .
At the same time, across products investments of the follower decrease at a
slower pace than those of the leader,
∂g
[j]
L,CON
∂i
<
∂g
[l]
L,CON
∂i
< 0.
5.2 Product Innovations Investments
Now consider differences in product innovations. As it has been noted, the
value of the process innovations game estimated at zero technology level is
higher for the follower, as it may be seen from (22). Hence,the investments
into the product innovations of the follower are higher than those of the
leader, as (27) are completely symmetric except for the value functions of
the process innovations game. It follows, that the higher is the difference in
values generated for both firms by the process innovations game, the higher
is the difference in variety expansion investments.
The difference in product innovations strategies of the firms is illustrated
on the Figure 4. The same set of parameters as before is used.
With constant leadership in process innovations variety expansion in-
vestments are rather large for both firms. The rate of investments is not
constant and depends negatively on the already achieved level of variety
n(t). It decreases rapidly until zero. The firm which is the leader in process
innovations invests less then the follower all the time. The decrease in in-
tensity of product innovations over time is explained through the increasing
complexity of the development of process innovations for every next product
within the products’ range. Since the only source of new value is the value
generated by the development of the production technologies for new prod-
ucts through process innovations, it becomes less attractive to introduce new
products in comparison to the development of already existing ones as the
process of variety expansion approaches its limit N .
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Figure 4: Specialization: the following firm invests more into prod-
uct innovations because of the spillover effect.
Proposition 14 Product innovations investments are higher for the follow-
ing firm all the time, u[j](t) < u[l](t), and they slow down for both firms while
the variety expansion process approaches its limit,
∂u
[j]
L,CON
∂n(t)
< 0,
∂u
[l]
L,CON
∂n(t)
< 0.
In particular, they slow down over time,
∂u
[j]
L,CON
∂t
< 0,
∂u
[l]
L,CON
∂t
< 0.
There is substantial difference between firms’ investments into production
technologies of new products and the spillover effect is strong enough to boost
variety expansion investments of the firm which is the follower in process
innovations. At the same time it has to be noted that due to the open-loop
nature of the investment strategies analysed here both firms invest non-zero
amounts into variety expansion irrespective of their positions in the process
innovations game. It may be shown that this is not the case in closed-loop
situation, where total variety expansion investments are made by the follower
only while the leader is investing strictly zero amount.
The endogenous specialization of innovative activities between firms in the
model follows the natural selection criteria: the firm which is more efficient
in investing into one or the other type of innovations is specializing in this
kind of innovations. Yet this specialization is not the full one, as both firms
invest non-zero amounts in both directions of their activities. The overall
process of generation of innovations may be described by the 3-dimensional
reconstruction at Figure 5.
Here one may observe the underlying process of generation of products
variety, n(t), together with associated processes of technology improvements
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Figure 5: Common product innovations is the generator of process
innovations.
for both firms and for different products. The domination in technology
levels is preserved along all the range of products to be invented. The same
is true for the specialization of activities: the follower remains the follower in
all products process innovations and continues to invest more into the variety
expansion all the time.
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